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Abstract  
Today, there is a new group of approaches in academic debates about religion which 
enjoys high popularity and engages concepts such as post-secularity, public religion, 
and desecularization. These approaches suppose that religion has an increasing presence 
in and impact on the public sphere of modern societies, including Western Europe. This 
paper questions these assumptions by arguing that the public presence and impact of 
religion is widely overstated. An excessively vast definition of religion allows these 
approaches to identify religion in a wide variety of phenomena in the public sphere. 
Applying, instead, a more precise definition of religion, it appears that religious actors 
participate mainly in a non-religious way in the public sphere. Therefore, this paper 
argues that religious actors adapt their public communication to the requirements of a 
secularized public sphere in which religion assumes a public role only in very 
exceptional occasions and specific contexts. Finally, the author supposes that the current 
debates about public religion create a myth of past secularity. This myth wrongly 
suggests that there was a secular past in which religious actors were banned from the 
public sphere of modern societies.  
 
Keywords: public religion, desecularization, post-secular society, public sphere 
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1) Introduction  
Public religion, desecularization, and post-secularity are the new buzzwords in the 
scientific study of religion. They mark a new era, perhaps a new paradigm, of academic 
thinking about religion. The supporters of this new trend purport that secularization 
theory was wrong: religion is neither disappearing nor suffering significant losses in the 
context of modernity. Instead, religion is as vivacious as ever. For many of these 
observers, the age of secularity has ended – or, in fact, never existed – while religion is 
resurging: even the societies of Western Europe which once served as a prime example 
for secularization theory are experiencing a resurgence of religion. Here, the continuing 
and rising presence of religion becomes particularly manifest in the public sphere, 
according to this view. Religion is assuming a new public role and thereby refutes the 
long-standing assumption of a privatization of religion. However, are Western European 
societies currently experiencing such a deprivatization of religion? Are we facing a new 
age of public religion? 
In today’s academia, we face an increasing debate about the public role of 
religion. Concepts that highlight the public presence of religion enjoy a strong 
popularity and an almost unquestionable status. Nevertheless, it is unclear if this 
popularity is due to the fact that these approaches capture the empirical reality in an 
authentic way or if their popularity is rather the product of a ‘hype’ of these concepts in 
academic debates about religion. This article will take a critical stance on the 
assumption that Western Europe is experiencing a rising presence and impact of religion 
in its public sphere(s). Its objective is to question public-religion-approaches and to 
indicate some of their central flaws. The main argument is that the presence and 
importance of public religion in Western Europe is generally overstated. I will support 
this hypothesis by presenting different arguments that critically analyze public-religion-
approaches and cast doubt on their theses. The term ‘public-religion-approaches’ will be 
used in this article to refer to approaches that purport a significant and/or rising presence 
and impact of religion in the public sphere of modern societies. 
Since public-religion-approaches refer to the presence of religion in the public 
sphere we should briefly define what the terms ‘public sphere’ and ‘religion’ mean. The 
public sphere can be defined as an open social arena in which a significant part of the 
population of a society participates passively- or actively. This arena (or: sphere) is 
dedicated to the gathering, production and distribution of information and opinions and 
is shaped by the presence of mass media (Gerhards and Neidhardt, 1991: 44-59). 
Modern societies embrace a variety of public and media spheres (Dalferth, 2010: 
324).The most visible and crucial public sphere is perhaps the political public sphere. Its 
debates can potentially affect the whole population of a society and intermediate 
between the citizens of a society and its political system (Gerhards and Neidhardt, 
1991). Public-religion-approaches often refer to this sphere, in which they posit a 
significant and/or rising presence of religion. Another definition that would be 
necessary here is a definition of religion. However, as we will see later, a central 
criticism in this article regards the absence of an appropriate definition in public-
religion-approaches. To overcome this flaw, I will propose a rather classical and limited 
definition specifying religion as communications and/or practices referring to a 
supernatural reality.  
The article is structured in the following way: it begins with a brief overview of 
the evolution of the academic debate about public religion. After this follows a section 
dedicated to the description of public-religion-approaches. In this section I will discuss 
some of the current studies and outline the common assumptions of public-religion-
approaches. The next section presents my criticism of public-religion-approaches which 




2) The evolution of the secularization-debate: From the ‘disappearance of religion’ 
to the ‘resurgence of public religion’ 
The secularization thesis once constituted the most accepted and undisputed concept in 
the study of religion. It dominated academic debates about religion until the 1970s 
(Stark and Finke, 2000: 57-79). In the context of the secularization debate, the early 
Peter L. Berger (1990[1967]) and Thomas Luckmann (2000[1960]) were those who 
highlighted the privatization of religious belief. Peter L. Berger hypothesized that by 
means of socio-economic development, religion would be crowded out from the public 
sphere. The private sphere would remain the last sphere available for religious practice: 
religion would become a private issue (Berger, 1990[1967]: 127-53). Thomas 
Luckmann (2000[1960]) added to the idea of religious privatization while rejecting the 
idea of secularization at the same time. Instead of asserting a decline of religion, he 
assumed that religion would just become ‘invisible’. According to Luckmann, the social 
appearance of religion had been altered in modern societies and was now often hardly 
recognisable as religion. Religion was not disappearing or declining but just changing 
its form and becoming more individual and private. (Luckmann, 2000[1960], 1996). 
According to this new thesis, religion would be banned from the public sphere 
and confined to the almost invisible private sphere of individuals. The practice of 
religion would become more and more a matter of private choice and cease to have any 
effect on the public sphere (See also Wilson, 1977: 176). This was the so-called 
‘privatization-thesis’ of religion which redefined the secularization theory and became a 
mainstream position in the study of religion. In contrast to the classical secularization 
thesis, supporters of the ‘privatization’ thesis supposed a privatization of religion but 
not necessarily a decline in the individual practice of religion.  
The dominance of the privatization thesis was challenged by the pioneering 
work of José Casanova (1994). In his ground-breaking book, ‘Public Religions in the 
Modern World’, Casanova subdivided the secularization thesis into three different 
hypotheses: (1) the functional differentiation of secular spheres from religion, (2) the 
decline of religious practice and belief, and (3) the privatization of religion. It was the 
third hypothesis, the privatization-thesis, which he tried to refute in this work. Instead of 
an advancing privatization of religion, Casanova supposed that in many modern 
societies religion would still assume a public role. Moreover, a deprivatization of 
religion might even be taking place in many societies (Casanova, 1994: 41). He defined 
deprivatization in the following way:  
 
‘By deprivatization I mean the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are 
refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as 
theories of secularization had reserved for them.’ (Casanova, 1994: 5) 
 
According to this view, the privatization of religion was not a necessary 
imperative of modern societies. In many cases religion maintained its public function 
and refused to be confined to a marginal, private role. In some cases religion might even 
assume a new and enhanced public role (Casanova, 1994: 39,215).  
With the publication of ‘Public Religions in the Modern World’, Casanova 
coined the term ‘public religion’. The term refers to religion or religious organizations 
participating effectively in the public sphere of modern societies. The idea of public 
religion became increasingly salient in scientific debates and marked the beginning of a 
new discourse about religion in modern societies. Despite this success, Casanova has 
made several changes to his approach since the 1994 publication of his seminal work. 
He reacted to criticisms – that charged him with Western-centrism and methodological 
nationalism – by assuming a more global perspective and arguing that the predominant 
concept of secularization is mainly a Western European ideology (Casanova 2003, 
2006, 2008, 2011). At the same time, he maintained his general assumption of a 
deprivatization of religion and even extended the argument in two ways. First, 
Casanova became more open to the idea of religion acting in the political sphere. While 
he was keen to limit public religions in his earlier work to the domain of civil society, 
he states in his more recent publications that the presence of religion in the political 
public or even the state may not necessarily contradict the requirements of democratic 
politics. Second, he assumes a clearer position with regard to the case of Western 
Europe where he witnesses a rising presence of religion in the public sphere (Casanova 
2006, 2008). 
At least two other authors were crucial for promoting the idea of a resurgence of 
religion in politics and public affairs: Samuel P. Hunthington (2003) and the late Peter 
Berger (1999). In his ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Samuel P. Hunthington (2003) identified 
religion as a key factor for the presumed clash of different cultures. However, his 
general argument about the clash of civilizations was treated with scepticism among 
scholars of religion. Instead, the ideas of the late Peter Berger were more openly 
received in the academic discipline. Berger refuted his previous privatization thesis and 
argued in ‘The Desecularization of the World’ that the ‘world today (..) is as furiously 
religious as it ever was, and in some places more than ever.’ (Berger, 1999: 2)  
Authors like Casanova shifted the academic debates about religion to a new 
direction toward a new paradigm, a paradigm which would declare the death of 
secularization theory and proclaim a rising public importance of religion in late 
modernity.1  
 
3) Public-religion-approaches as a new trend in the study of religion  
Casanova’s argument about public religion spurred the emergence of a new trend in the 
scientific study of religion. Rapidly, the idea of public religion spread and gained 
popularity within academic debates. From this point on, one could observe an 
increasing number of publications rejecting the privatization thesis of religion and 
claiming a ‘deprivatization’ and/ or comeback of religion. Academic and public debates 
began to insinuate a rising role of religion in the public sphere of modern societies. The 
idea of the persistent and mounting importance of religion in the public sphere of 
modern societies almost achieved the status of a truism in academic discourses.  
Today’s academic discourse about public religion is a transdisciplinary one in 
which different academic fields such as sociology, political and religious sciences, 
theology and philosophy participate (Meyer and Moore 2006, Meyer 2006b). Although 
the contributions may draw on different disciplinary backgrounds, they all have at least 
one thing in common: they refer to the presence of religion in the public sphere of 
modern societies. Therefore, I will group them under the umbrella term ‘public-religion-
approaches’. The assumptions and hypotheses of public-religion-approaches vary 
according to the particular theory. But we can identify common assumptions: 
• Religion can be empirically found in the public sphere of modern, Western 
societies. 
• There is a persistent – or even rising – presence of religion in the public 
sphere of modern, societies.  
• Religion has a significant – and/or increasing – impact on public debates.  
These assumptions characterize – with some variation – what I define here as public- 
religion-approaches. This characterization forms a generalization which implies that the 
description and the following arguments do not correspond to every contribution to the 
debate about public religion. The aim of this article is not to create an exhaustive 
description of the variety of public religion approaches, but to point to some frequent 
flaws in the debate about public religion in the Western European context. Although 
some of the arguments could also be raised with regard to the general debate about 
public religion, the arguments in this article will draw particularly on contributions 
assuming a rising presence of religion in Western Europe’s public. 
 One can classify public religion approaches that refer to Western Europe into 
roughly three ‘camps’: first, approaches witnessing and welcoming a new presence of 
religion in Europe`s public; second, approaches describing a new presence of religion 
without assuming a normative position; and third, a very small camp of approaches 
viewing the impact of public religion on Europe’s democracies critically. In the 
following, I will mention some examples for each camp.  
 The most famous author from the first camp is Jürgen Habermas (2001, 2005, 
2006, 2008). He argues that a new age, the age of post-secularity, has begun. Previously 
vastly secularized societies, like the highly developed countries of Europe, Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada, would experience a new awareness of religion and attribute a 
new public role to religion. From now on, religion would constitute a relevant dialogue 
partner in the public debates of these societies (Habermas, 2008). Moreover, Habermas 
presents a normative argument about public religion: he recommends that post-secular 
societies should facilitate religious contributions to the public sphere. Religious 
reasoning could contribute to public debates about the ethical values of 
contemporaneous and future societies. Habermas believes that modern societies might 
find some answers to the moral questions of our time by listening to religion in public 
debates (Habermas, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2008). A similar position to that of Habermas is 
proposed by Leclerc (2001) and French sociologist Willaime (2004a, 2004b, 
2005[1995]: 76-78, 2008). Willaime observes that even the highly secularized public 
and political sphere of France is exhibiting a new, more open attitude towards religion. 
The hypersecularity of France would stimulate a restructuration process of religion. 
According to Willaime, religion can form an important resource for public debates and 
be engaged in the identity construction process of individuals and collectives. 
Contributions from this camp emphasize the positive role that religion can play as a 
discursive resource in public debates of (post-secular) societies. 
 The second camp assumes a more descriptive perspective by observing and 
explaining the supposed presence of public religion in Western Europe. The most 
prominent example of this camp would be, of course, José Casanova. Another famous 
sociologist of religion who addresses the topic of public religion in her recent work is 
Grace Davie (2006a, 2006b). She believes that the immigration of individuals from 
different parts of the world has put the European model of secularization into question. 
While the European secularization model advances the privatization of religion, many 
of the ‘newcomers’ have different ideas with regard to the appropriate place of religion 
in society. Consequently, Europeans do not only have to launch debates about the public 
role of religion, but religion also becomes increasingly present in Western Europe`s 
public: 
 
„[r]eligion will increasingly penetrate the public sphere, a tendency driven 
largely by the presence of Islam in different parts of Europe.” (Davie 2006a: 
33) 
 
 Two further examples for this camp are Koenig and Eder. Koenig (2008) 
argues that religion has gained a new presence and vitality in the public in the context of 
the European unification process. According to him, the process of European integration 
is resulting in a new, privileged role of religion in the European public. Klaus Eder 
(Eder, 2002; Bosseti and Eder, 2006) supposes, similarly to Habermas, the existence of 
a process of ‘post-secularization’. Post-Secularization, according to Eder, means that 
religion is becoming more and more public and less private. He supposes that religion is 
returning to the public sphere in Western Europe. Although the authors from this camp 
generally assume a descriptive perspective, they tend in some occasions toward 
positions similar to that of the first camp by pointing to the positive potential of 
religion.2  
 Finally, the last camp views the alleged presence of religion in the public 
sphere from a more critical perspective. One example for the last camp is Thomas 
Meyer (2006, 2007). Thomas Meyer posits that religion is becoming increasingly 
involved in the public and political sphere. He regards this process, in opposition to 
Habermas, Willaime and Leclerc, not as positive but as a potential threat to the secular 
foundations of the modern state. However, Meyers’ point of view does not seem to 
reflect the common position of public religion approaches. In general, scholars rather 
appear to welcome the supposed new presence of religion in Western Europe’s public 
sphere(s). 
This classification provides a brief overview of contributions that assume an 
increasing presence of religion in Western Europe`s public spheres. In addition to this 
literature that stresses the case of Western Europe, there is a wide range of studies that 
address the topic of public religion (Boettcher and Harmon (2009), Bottici (2009), 
During (2005), Dreyer and Pieterse (2010), Kettel (2009), Lichterman (2007), Birgit 
Meyer (2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008), Meyer and Moore (2006), Mörschl (2006), 
Philpott (2007), Riesebrodt (2001), Vries, Sullivan, and Ward (2008), Ward (2006), 
Ziebertz and Riegel (2010)). These contributions form part of an increasing academic 
debate which circulates around the idea of public religion. None of these studies 
questions critically if there is indeed a significant or rising presence of religion in the 
public sphere of modern Western societies. 
The existing and still rising number of publications concerning public religion 
illustrates that Casanova’s ideas have become a popular concept in the academic debate 
about religion. Today, the concept of public religion is perhaps the most ‘trendy’ 
approach in the scientific discourse about religion. Criticism of the idea of public 
religion is rare, if not absent. One exception is perhaps Dalferth (2010), who points out 






4) A critical stance on public-religion-approaches  
In this section I will critically analyze public-religion-approaches. The principal 
argument is that public-religion-approaches overstate the presence and impact of 
religion in the public sphere of modern societies, particularly Western Europe.  
The argument is divided into seven points. I start by stressing the fact that most 
public-religion-approaches lack an explicit definition of religion. In the second point, I 
try to detect the implicit definition of religion in these approaches. It turns out that 
public-religion-approaches utilize excessively wide and vague definitions of religion. 
Therefore, I will raise a more restricted definition of religion. Based on the new 
definition, I will discuss in the following points the absence of religious reasoning in 
public communication and the fact that religion in the public sphere of Western 
European societies is an exceptional case which is reserved for specific contexts. 
Finally, I will describe how these approaches create a myth of past secularity.  
 
a) The absence of a definition of religion  
Most public-religion-approaches lack an accurate definition of religion. What these 
approaches mean by referring to public religion remains an open question since they do 
not provide an explicit definition of religion. They do not clarify which social 
phenomena are of a ‘religious nature’ and which phenomena are not. Thus, they can 
potentially declare a variety of different phenomena in the public sphere as religion. The 
absence of an explicit definition may be partly due to the often cited difficulties to 
define religion. Many scholars of religion suppose that it is mostly or even totally 
impossible to define religion in an appropriate way (cf. Matthes 1992, 1993; Smith 
1982, Tennbruck 1993; see for a critical discussion of this debate Riesebrodt 2007).  
But even so, social scientists should at least roughly declare what their subject of 
study is and what general characteristics it has. This is even more important when the 
basic argument is that there is a significant presence of a phenomenon X in a specific 
social sphere. To prove that there is X in this sphere, we will have to outline what X is 
beforehand. The omission of a definition of X will necessarily lead to arbitrary 
judgements about the presence of X. This is today the case in the academic debates 
about public religion. The fact that religion is not defined facilitates its detection 
everywhere scholars regard it as useful for their own observations. The ‘identification’ 
of religion in the public sphere becomes an arbitrary act.  
Defining religion does not mean to determine the essence and ‘real nature’ of 
religion and to provide an irrefutable distinction between religion and non-religious 
social phenomena. Rather, a definition can constitute a pragmatic basis for the empirical 
and theoretical work by clarifying what is regarded as religion. Thereby, the definition 
helps to reduce the probability of arbitrary conclusions about the presence of religion. It 
goes without saying that there are various valid definitions of religion which may serve 
for different topics. 
 b) The implicit definition: An excessively wide concept of religion 
As stated before, most public-religion-approaches lack an explicit definition of religion. 
One has to infer how these approaches define religion by analysing their comments 
about public religion. Thus, we can deduce their concept of religion from examples of 
public religion. However, many of the contributions to the debate on public religion do 
not include empirical examples, so it is hard to imagine what is meant by the idea of 
public religion. In other cases, studies give empirical examples. In these cases they 
attribute the idea of public religion generally to two types of communication. First, the 
concept of public religion is attributed to mass media communication and public 
debates about topics that are somehow related to religion. Prominent examples 
mentioned in the literature are the assassination of the Dutch film-maker Theo Van 
Gogh, the reactions to the publication of the ‘Danish’ cartoons depicting Mohammed, 
the debate about the use of religious symbols in public buildings, the EU accession of 
Turkey, and the riots in French banlieus in late 2005 (cf. Casanova 2009, Davie 2006b, 
2009; Habermas 2008). In these examples, a topic which is at least partly attributed to 
religion is moved into the spotlight of public debates. Second, public religion 
approaches refer to communications or actions that are emitted by religious actors – 
such as individuals, groups or organizations associated with religion. Casanova, for 
instance, uses the concept of public religion with regard to Catholics and/or 
Evangelicals rising up against dictatorships, social injustice or the legalization of 
abortion (Casanova 1994). Habermas (2008), as another example, alludes to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury who proposed that the British legislature should adapt parts 
of the Sharia-law for its Muslim population. In these examples, a religious actor 
publicly supports a specific normative and/or political position.  
Hence, there are two types of communication to which public religion 
approaches frequently refer as public religion. But are these types of communication 
religious? In the first case, there is public communication about topics which are 
regarded as related to religion. This type of communication may refer to religion but 
does not necessarily consist of religious communication. The same is also true for the 
communication of religious actors. Not every public communication or practice 
undertaken by a religious actor is necessarily religious. The ‘religious nature’ of these 
two types of communication is not evident. I will clarify this point by stressing the 
example of religious actors communicating in the public sphere.  
Public-religion-approaches attribute the term ‘religion’ to statements or actions 
from organizations, groups or individuals associated with religion. Regarding this 
concept of religion, we may question if everything what actors which are associated 
with religion communicate or do is necessarily religion. Is it religion if a religious 
leader mentions to a friend that he has to diet due to a health issue? And if he manifests 
it publicly should we define his communication then as public religion?  
This enquiry leads to the question of what features a particular communication 
should have to be defined properly as religious. If the only criterion which defines a 
communication as religious is the fact that the communicating individual is strongly 
associated with a religious organization, then every communication transmitted by this 
actor must be defined as religious. This includes his comments about his eating and 
drinking habits, the weather, sports, and other leisure time activities. Consequently, an 
individual associated with religion, could not communicate in a non-religious way. With 
such a definition we lose the possibility of differentiating between religious and non-
religious communication from actors who are associated with religion. The preaching of 
an evangelical pastor against the demons of modern life and his prayers for the salvation 
of his members would be equally religious to him complaining about the scruffy shape 
of public transport and corruption among municipal authorities. We can transfer this 
argument back to the public sphere: Here, an evangelical leader predicting publicly the 
end of times and the return of Jesus would be equally religious to him explaining 
publicly the structural reorganization of the church and the reduction of church 
personal. Are these two types of communication equally religious? Or should we rather 
acknowledge that actors related to religious organizations can also communicate in a 
non-religious way? If so, we need to develop a criterion which distinguishes between 
religious and non-religious communication from religious actors. Public-religion-
approaches do not provide a definition which would allow such a distinction. They tend 
to attribute the term religion to communication from religious actors regardless of the 
content of the communication. It is dubious to which extent such a concept of religion 
still reflects the common meaning of the term.  
The implicit concept of religion which is held by public-religion-approaches is 
an excessively ‘wide’ one which renders it impossible to distinguish religion clearly 
from other types of communication and practice.4 Applying the term ‘religion’ to a 
variety of social phenomena – which are hardly of a ‘religious nature’ – allows the 
supporters of public-religion-approaches to diagnose an unprecedented presence of 
religion in the public sphere of modern societies. Hence, the new visibility of religion 
seems to be less due to a change in the empirical reality than to a broadening of the 
definition of religion. 
In order to determine if religion has a significant presence in the public sphere of 
modern societies, it is necessary to apply an appropriate definition of religion. We need 
a clear and limiting definition which enables us to distinguish between religious and 
non-religious social phenomena in the public sphere.  
One exception among public religion approaches is Birgit Meyer.5 She presents 
a practical and limited definition of religion. Religion is conceptualized by her as the 
mediation of transcendence. Religions create a distance between the individual and the 
supernatural and mediate this difference by offering mediated links to the supernatural 
(Meyer/Moore 2006: 7, Meyer 2006a: 290, 2006b: 6, 13, 2006c: 435). Such mediation 
implies, of course, the use of references to transcendence. In the following I draw on 
this approach by defining religion as communication and/or practice that refers to a 
supernatural – transcendent – reality. This definition is perhaps the most common and 
simple definition in the sociology of religion (cf. Stark and Finke 2000: 89-96, 
Luhmann 2000, Riesebrodt 2007, Schäfer 2009). At the same it corresponds to the 
phenomena that are generally described as religion in a Western cultural context. Most 
importantly, it renders religion easily distinguishable from other types of social practice 
and communication, be them political, scientific, economic or moral etc. Therefore, it 
allows us to exclude some phenomena that other definitions generously consider to be 
religion. As a result of this definition, we can say that communications and practices 
which do not refer to a supernatural sphere or entity (transcendent reality) are not 
religious and should not be subsumed under the term ‘religion’. 
Religious communication takes place when supernatural concepts such as ‘hell’, 
‘Jesus Christ’, ‘Satan’, ‘God's will’ etc. are applied: an evangelical pastor publicly 
saying that we must eradicate poverty because it is God's will or claiming that 
homosexuality is the work of satanic forces would be examples of public religion. 
Therefore religious communication involves explicit references to entities that are 
defined as supernatural. In order to define social phenomena as religion, one would also 
have to take the context into account. There is a difference between the word ‘God’ 
being used in a church service and by a speaker at a sociological conference about 
religion. In the latter case one, would hardly define the communication of the speaker as 
religious communication. Although it is important to take the context of the 
communication into account, for the sake of simplicity I will largely refrain from the 




c) The secularity of ‘religious’ contributions to the public sphere 
According to the definition proposed above, I will use the reference to the supernatural 
as a criterion for the presence of religion. Keeping this criterion in mind, one can 
examine if actions and communications that are generally denominated as ‘religion’ by 
public-religion-approaches fit this definition of religion. I have mentioned two types of 
communication to which public religion approaches refer: 1) public debates about topics 
related to religion and 2) contributions of religious actors to the public sphere. 
Regarding the first type, it is evident that public debates about topics related to religion 
do usually not fulfil the criterion for religious communication. For instance, mass media 
reports of the killing of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh referred to the religious 
motives of the perpetrator but did not employ religious communication themselves 
while describing the event, for instance, as God’s revenge. Western European mass 
media coverage of topics related to religion will generally not employ any type of 
mediation with the supernatural and is therefore hardly of a religious nature. Instead 
public agents will use a secular scheme of reasoning abstaining from references to the 
supernatural.  
The second type of communication is more complicated. Religious actors often 
represent a religious organization when they emit public communication. Yet, not every 
public contribution from religious actors is necessarily a religious communication. 
According to the proposed definition, only those public communications which apply a 
religious argument by referring to a supernatural entity or concept are religious.  
Organizations, groups and individuals associated with religion can involve 
themselves in different ways in the public sphere. Representatives of religious 
organizations can participate in a direct way in the public sphere by joining, for 
instance, TV talk shows, or radio programs. Moreover, they can publish their opinions 
in books, journals, or on web-pages. One of the most important ways of public 
communication for religious actors is the release of press statements. Thus, in order to 
explore the public communication of a religious organization, one can analyse its press 
statements. One can take, for instance, the press-releases, from the Church of England 
and the Evangelical Church in Germany. Both institutions represent a large share of the 
religious market in their home-countries and are therefore assumed to be highly 
influential religious actors in the public sphere. But is their public communication 
religious?  
We can answer this question by looking at press statements of these institutions. 
Press statements about different public issues can be found on the webpage of the 
Evangelical Church in Germany. These statements include topics such as the ratification 
of the European treaty (title: ‘The world needs a strong Europe!’), fall of the Berlin 
Wall, right wing radicalism in Germany, and norms and values in the finance sector 
(Evangelical Church in Germany, 2010). The press statements published on the 
webpage of the Evangelical Church in Germany consider mainly secular topics and do 
not involve religious language. The Church of England shows the same tendency. 
Among its news releases in November and December 2009 figure titles such as ‘Ban 
product placement on TV should remain, says Church’, ‘Archbishops’ statement on 
swine flu’, and ‘Use cash not credit cards, say new videocasts helping Christmas 
shopper stay on budget’ (Church of England, 2010). In the press statements I read, 
religious language was absent: there were no references to supernatural concepts like 
god, hell, heaven etc. Their reasoning was, instead, based exclusively on secular 
arguments. Daniel Meier (2006) observes a similar pattern in his study about the 
Evangelical and Catholic Church in the German print media. Their press statements 
mainly tackle secular – ethical or organizational – topics and abstain from religious 
argumentation.  
But not only press releases also the participation of representatives of religious 
organizations in TV debates and radio programs appear to be rather secular. Their 
contributions assume generally a non-religious character. Instead of referring to the will 
of God, representatives of Christian churches will justify their opinion and demands 
with non-religious arguments.6   
Certainly, sophisticated research would be necessary to verify if this is a general 
pattern in the public communication of religious actors in Western Europe. Such 
research would have to study in a comprehensive form the way in which religious 
organizations communicate in the public sphere and if their public communications 
refer to supernatural concepts. Yet, at a brief glance it appears that there is a tendency 
among religious individuals, groups and organisations to abstain from religious 
communication in the public sphere of Western European societies. Their public 
communication stays widely free of religious concepts.  
Public-religion-approaches describe public statements from religious actors as a 
manifestation of public religion. Their hypothesis of a persistent and rising presence of 
religion in the public sphere is based on the involvement of religious actors in the public 
sphere. But considering the way in which these actors involve in the public sphere, it 
seems as though their public contributions are mainly non-religious. Similarly to non-
religious actors they use non-religious communication to make contributions to public 
debates. Hence, it is not evident why their contributions should be classified as more 
religious than the contributions of other, non-religious actors in the public sphere. In the 
light of these observations, public religion as posited by public-religion-approaches 
vanishes. What remains is non-religious communication conducted by religious actors.  
In addition to this point, one could scrutinize the impact of public communications 
emitted by religious actors. The real impact of these contributions on public debates is 
questionable. Regarding the example of the Archbishop of Canterbury proposing Sharia 
law, one could argue that even in the case that religious actors manage to communicate 
their arguments to a wide audience, they are often not taken seriously in public debates.  
 
d) The secularity of the public sphere of modern, Western societies  
Religious organizations, groups and individuals tend to communicate in a non-religious 
way in the political public sphere. Since they are primarily defined as religious actors 
we may wonder why they communicate in a non-religious rather than in a religious way 
in the public sphere. 
The most compelling explanation for the secularity of their public communication is 
that religious actors adapt to the requirements of a secular public sphere. The political 
public sphere of Western-European societies can be characterized as a non-religious 
sphere. Religious reasoning is not literally banned from the public sphere, but it is not 
considered to be an appropriate form of communication in public debates. 
Communications referring to the will of the supernatural, for instance, would lack any 
common ground and connectivity in a public political debate. There would be very little 
prospect for such communication to be picked up by other public agents (mass media, 
commentators, politicians etc.) in a serious manner.  
The secularity of the public sphere is due to a wider secularization process which 
was prominently described by secularization theorists such as Steve Bruce (Wallis and 
Bruce, 1992, Bruce, 2003, 2010). The process of functional differentiation in Western 
European societies has led to religious communication and reasoning being increasingly 
excluded from the political public sphere. The public sphere has become a non-religious 
sphere. Thus, the reasoning and logic involved in public debates are fundamentally 
secular and alien to religious reasoning. That does not mean that religious actors cannot 
try to involve themselves in the public sphere. Obviously, they participate in public 
debates. But they do not deploy religious concepts to do so. Religious organizations 
adapt to the secularity of public debates by communicating in a non-religious way. 
Thereby they improve their chances of being heard and acknowledged in public debates. 
Otherwise they would possibly be ignored or mocked.  
Even Casanova (1994) assumes in his early work that religious organizations, in 
order to effectively engage in the public sphere, would have to commit themselves to 
the functional differentiation between religion and other social spheres. Nevertheless, 
the unspoken standard appears to be even more demanding by requiring religious actors 
to commit themselves to secular communication and to refrain from religious reasoning. 
Consequently, the public sphere is a social context from which religion is widely 
excluded. In public debates religion can hardly be involved in a direct manner. 
Nevertheless, in specific social contexts religion does seem to be a convenient mode of 
communication in the public sphere, as the two following points will show. But these 
contexts remain marginal and are of a minor impact in the public. 
 
e) Public religion as an exceptional case  
Despite the secularity of the public sphere, the modern ‘ban’ on public religion is not 
absolute. There are exceptions. Religion may become public when exceptional, 
incomprehensible events of major public impact occur in a society. Examples of these 
are major catastrophes or emotional events that can hardly be grasped in rational terms. 
In these cases religion may assume a public function: by offering a ritual and a scheme 
of interpretation which refers to a transcendent reality, religion can help citizens to 
overcome the experience of such events and transform them into a more meaningful 
complexity. Public memorial services may, for instance, be conducted by religious 
organizations and broadcasted on the national television channels on such occasions.7 
However, after such events occur, religion disappears rapidly from the public scene.  
Public religion deals with exceptional events. Religion in the main areas of the 
public sphere is limited to these very specific contexts which enable religion to enter the 
public sphere for a short time. In everyday debates of the public sphere there is no place 
for religion. They constitute a different social context which is not accessible for 
religion, as described above.  
Hence, there is only a very limited presence of religion in the central spots of the 
public sphere while religious communication remains excluded from the everyday 
political public debates. 
 
f) Religious niches in the public sphere  
There are different public spheres in modern societies. The wider public sphere of 
modern societies consists of a variety of different publics which focus on different 
topics and are based on different logics. The public sphere which attracts most attention 
and forms the key area of the public is the political public sphere. Besides this, there are 
other public spheres which correspond to specific sub-systems of the society (Dalferth 
2010). Among these, there are specific public spheres in which religious communication 
is facilitated or even requested. In some sites of Western Europe’s media space we can 
observe religious communication on a daily bases, such as religious TV and radio 
programs, journals and internet pages. They form public niches which are dedicated to 
religious communication. Here, religious actors can communicate in a religious way and 
refer to supernatural concepts without being rejected or mocked. Yet, these spheres are 
located in the periphery of the media space and constitute small and remote isles of 
religious communication. Individuals may publicly communicate and practice religion 
on a daily basis in these media spaces, but their communication stays remote from the 
key areas of the public sphere.  
These niches of religious communication are different from the political public 
sphere. They are neither involved nor directly connected to the political public sphere. 
The fact that religious communication takes place in the remote periphery of the public 
indicates the position and role of religious communication in the public sphere of 
Western European societies: it is marginal. In the main arenas of the public sphere 
religion forms an exceptional case for very seldom occasions, while the daily media 
appearance of religion is situated in the remote periphery of the public. 
 
g) The myth of past secularity 
Public-religion-approaches posit that there is a new presence of religion in the public 
sphere of modern societies. Religion is becoming more and more public. By suggesting 
that religion is more public than it has been before, they – directly or indirectly – create 
an image of a secular past in which communication from religious actors was almost or 
totally absent from the public sphere (Dalferth, 2010: 323). 
Especially the increasingly popular notion of ‘post-secular society’ suggests that 
there was an entirely secular age which is now replaced by a new stage of social 
evolution: the post-secular society. While religion was marginalized and religious actors 
were not permitted to participate in the public of the secular society, the post-secular 
society would now assign a new, enhanced public role to religion (Habermas, 2008). 
Yet, approaches which purport a new or rising presence of religion do not present any 
data which would support this assumption. 
Was there ever a secular age? Was there ever a total ban on or disregard of public 
statements from religious actors in Western Europe’s public spheres? Analogically to 
what Stark and Finke call the myth of past piety (Stark 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000: 63-
68) we can observe modern scholars of religion engaging in constructing a new myth: 
the myth of past secularity.8 Terms like post-secularity, desecularization and 
deprivatization of religion spur the idea of a past secularity. Such an age of secularity 
hardly existed in Western Europe. Public communication from religious actors never 
suffered a total ban or disregard in the public sphere of modern societies. Religious 
actors always participated in its public debates; even if their contributions were and are 
mainly of a non-religious character. Instead of a new public presence of religion there 
seems to be rather a new attention towards religion in the academic discourses (cf. 
Pollack, 2006).   
 
 
5) Conclusion  
The purpose of this article was to raise some critical questions regarding public-
religion-approaches. Public-religion-approaches emphasize the public presence and 
impact of religion in modern societies. They posit a significant and/or rising impact of 
religion on the public sphere of modern societies, including Western Europe. However, 
their conclusions about a significant presence and impact of religion are based on 
diffuse and excessively wide concepts of religion. Applying the term ‘religion’ to a 
variety of social phenomena – which are often hardly of a religious nature – allows 
them to diagnose an unprecedented impact and presence of religion in the public sphere. 
Using a more restricted definition of religion, many phenomena described as religion by 
public-religion-approaches turn out to be non-religious. Religious actors – such as 
religious organizations, groups or individuals – appear to prefer the use of non-religious 
communication when participating in the public sphere. Therefore, it is questionable 
that there is a rise of public religion or a major presence of religion in Western Europe’s 
public spheres. Public religion does not appear to be a daily phenomenon: it remains 
rather limited to exceptional cases and contexts. Instead of becoming more and more 
religious, the public sphere continues to be mainly a secular sphere in which religious 
actors participate by conducting non-religious communication. Rather than reflecting 
the empirical reality, the assumption of a rise of ‘public religion’ seems to be merely a 
theoretical trend in the academic community.  
The arguments raised here indicate some general flaws of public-religion-
approaches and question their assumption of a significant and/or rising presence of 
religion on the public sphere of modern societies. However, in order to really determine 
the degree to which religious communication and practice does or does not play a role 
in the main areas of Western Europe’s public spheres, a comprehensive empirical 
research would be necessary. Such a study should be based on a clear and limited 
definition of religion.  
 
 






 One of the first authors to indicate the formation of a new paradigm in the academic 
study of religion was Stephan Warner (1993). The ‘death of secularization’ was 
proclaimed by Stark (1999) and Stark and Finke (2000) on the basis of their rational 
choice theory of religion. Although strongly related to the secularization debate rational 
choice theory is not directly linked to the debate about public religion since rational 
choice theory focuses on the second of the three secularizations hypotheses mentioned 
by Casanova (1994) arguing that the vitality of religious practice and belief is not 
related to modernization but to religious market competition. 
2
 Grace Davie (2009), for instance argues in an article published in The Guardian that 
“Europe should recall its religious heritage rather than deny it (…)” (Davie 2009). 
                                                                                                                                               
3
 Dalferth states: ‘Thus, a post-secular state is indifferent to questions of religion or non-
religion, and not merely neutral: There may be many religions and non-religions in 
society, but the state does not bother to define its relations to them in a particular way.’  
(Dalferth, 2010: 335) 
4
 A positive exception among public-religion-approaches is Eder’s approach since he 
defines religion in a more explicit way. He describes religion as communication about 
identity. Religion is defined by its function to construct social and individual identity by 
bridging between past, present and future (Eder, 2002: 9). Yet, his definition remains 
also excessively wide since there are many types of communication which can serve 
this purpose without necessarily being religious. 
5
 Meyer (2006a, 2008) presents some innovative research about religion and media in 
Ghana. Unfortunately, Meyer has so far not explored religious media in Western 
societies. With regard to the lack of studies about religion and media in Western Europe 
(Davie 2000: 104) it could result to be very fruitful for the debate about public religion 
to apply Meyers approach to the study of public religion in Western Europe. 
6
 An interesting example for this tendency gives also Schmalzbauer (2002). He shows 
for the case of the US that religiously convicted Evangelical and Catholic journalists 
either avoid any reference to their religious convictions or translate their religious 
convictions into a professional, secular language which is – if at all – only very distantly 
                                                                                                                                               
related to religion. Religious language is not regarded as a suitable form of 
communication in the public sphere. 
7
 The functional perspective to religion which is mentioned here derives from 
Luhmann’s theory of religion. He defines the function of religion as the transformation 
of unknown, indefinable complexity into definable complexity by applying the religious 
code of transcendence (supernatural) and immanence (Luhmann, 2000). An empirical 
example for this function in the public sphere could be the suicide of the German 
national keeper Robert Enke in 2009. His suicide shocked the German public. Several 
memorial services, marches and devotions of major public impact took place. Thus, the 
subsequent religious treatment of his suicide may serve as an example of public 
religion. Another very popular international example would be the death of Diana 
Spencer (Lady Di).  
8
 Gorski (2000) rebutted Stark and Finke’s (2000) hypothesis of an almost unchristian 
medieval Europe on the basis of various studies showing that the medieval age was 
significantly more Christian than Stark and Finke supposed. Yet, the notion ‘post-
secular society’ introduced by Habermas appears to stipulate the existence of a secular 
period in the more recent past lasting perhaps until the 90s of the 20th century. 
Unfortunately, Habermas and other supporters of this idea do not clarify why the period 
in question was – in contrast to the current period – of a (more) secular nature.   
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